• One to Two TSCM Specialists.
• An initial threat and vulnerability assessment, determined through client discussion and preliminary review of the target location including an analysis of non-technical, counterintelligence related issues.
• A complete detailed physical inspection of the target area.
• Full RF spectrum analysis up to the upper Microwave GHz ranges.
• RF near field broadband analysis up to 12 GHz.
• RF near field differential detection analysis.
• Non-Linear Junction Detection (NLJD) and analysis (2-3 GHz).
• Laser / Infrared (IR) device detection.
• Visible light (all colors) audio-video transmission detection.
• Ultra sonic and inductive audio transmission detection.
• Active mic and wire detection.
• AC / Power Line Carriers (PLC) Carrier Current device detection.
• RF Video Transmission Detection, hidden or covert video camera, microphone and digital recorder detection.
• Acoustical leakage analysis.
• Physical and electronic inspection of telephone lines, coaxial cable and equipment.
• Thermal imaging analysis.
• Ultraviolet (UV) scan of critical surfaces in key areas (where practical) to check for signs of physical disturbances that may indicate possible tampering.
• Computer hardware physical examination along with a basic non-forensic computer security analysis including wireless networks.
• Pre and post construction security surveys reviews.
• TSCM support for protective operations.
• Optional Full Detailed Technical Reports

Each area included in a survey is inspected using a variety of methods in order to detect different eavesdropping attacks. The type of attack that could be located during this phase of the survey includes:

• Hidden voice activated tape recorders, digital recorders, and microdisk recorders.
• Remotely activated radio transmitters not on at the time of the RF sweep.
• Timer activated radio transmitters not on at the time of the RF sweep.
• Hardwired microphones using their own cabling or connected to spare telephone or LAN cabling.
• Fiber optic microphones.
• Intentional or coincidental paths for audio leakage from the area being inspected into adjoining areas.
• Contact and spike microphones located in adjoining areas that are picking up audio from the survey area.
• Vulnerability of each area to audio interception techniques from external sources such as remote pick-up of room audio from window surfaces.
• Audio from inactive loudspeakers connected to PA and audio-visual systems.